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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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_____________ 
 
Nos. 16-1047 and 16-2581 
_____________ 
  
DELON LUCIUS LANCASTER, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
               Respondent  
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(No. A039-060-369) 
 
Immigration Judge: Quynh V. Bain 
______________ 
 
Argued: May 11, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, RESTREPO and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 1, 2017) 
 
Michael S. Doluisio 
Ryan M. Moore 
Dechert LLP 
Cira Centre 
2929 Arch Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
 
Kimberly Cullen, Law Student [ARGUED] 
University of Pennsylvania School of Law 
3400 Chestnut Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
 Pro Bono Counsel for Petitioner 
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Joyce R. Branda 
Cindy S. Ferrier 
Surell Brady 
Timothy G. Hayes [ARGUED] 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice 
P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044  
 Counsel for Respondent 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner Delon Lancaster appeals from a decision of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) order of removal.  We will deny 
Lancaster’s petition for review.1 
I 
 Lancaster, a native of Guyana, was admitted to the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident at the age of six in 1985.  In 2004, he pled guilty to conspiracy to 
commit armed bank robbery and to using and carrying a firearm in a bank robbery 
conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 924(c).  He was sentenced to 161 months’ incarceration.  
These convictions rendered him removable from the United States.  Lancaster sought 
deferral of removal under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other 
                                                 
 *  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 
 1  Lancaster also filed a petition for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to 
reopen, but raises no claims on appeal regarding this motion.  We will, therefore, dismiss 
this petition for review. 
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Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).  S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–
20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  He asserted that he “is more likely than not to be tortured” if 
removed to Guyana because he is gay.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a).2 
 At a hearing before the IJ, Lancaster submitted three letters to support the 
contention that he will be tortured if returned to Guyana.  His aunt, who lives in Guyana, 
wrote that Lancaster’s father told “everyone” that Lancaster is gay and that “they are 
going to ‘kill’” him.  App. 372.  One of Lancaster’s cousins, who lives in the United 
States, wrote that another cousin who is a gang member in Guyana said that he will kill 
Lancaster because he is gay.  Another cousin, who also lives in the United States, wrote 
that Lancaster “wouldn’t survive in Guyana.”  App. 370.   
 Lancaster testified similarly that his “family” informed him that if he returns to 
Guyana he will be killed because of his sexual orientation.  App. 285.  The IJ questioned 
him, and some of these questions gave rise to a claim of bias before the BIA and this 
Court.  Specifically, the IJ asked Lancaster whether he could avoid harm in Guyana by 
either concealing his sexual orientation or not having sex with men. 
 The IJ denied Lancaster’s application for deferral of removal under CAT.  She 
gave several independent reasons for denying relief.  Among other things, she found that 
Lancaster’s testimony that he will be harmed in Guyana was “equivocal at best or 
                                                 
 2  An immigrant is entitled to deferral of removal under CAT if he establishes that 
he “is more likely than not to be tortured” in the country of removal.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.17(a).  Torture is defined as an act “by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). 
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speculative.”  App. 237.  In addition, Lancaster could relocate within Guyana to avoid 
harm, and he did not demonstrate that he will be tortured with the government’s 
acquiescence. 
 Regarding Lancaster’s letters, the IJ referred to each of them in her opinion and 
explained, albeit briefly, how they related to Lancaster’s testimony.  The IJ also noted 
that she considered all of the documents in evidence.3  The IJ stated that she gave “less 
weight to the letters from the relatives in Guyana because they were not available for 
examination in court.”  App. 235.4 
 Lancaster filed a pro se appeal to the BIA, which dismissed the appeal.  Like the 
IJ, the BIA found that Lancaster’s claim that he will be harmed in Guyana rested “on a 
series of suppositions which did not establish a clear probability of torture”; that 
Lancaster could relocate within Guyana to avoid harm; and that he had not proven 
government acquiescence.  App. 46.  Regarding the IJ’s treatment of Lancaster’s letters, 
the BIA found that “[t]hough the Immigration Judge considered the letters from the 
respondent’s family members as to the harm that the respondent would face upon 
removal to Guyana, she properly accorded them limited weight, as they were from 
interested witnesses not subject to cross-examination.”  App. 47 (citing In re H-L-H- & 
Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (BIA 2010), rev’d on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang 
                                                 
 3  In addition to the letters, the IJ considered reports of country conditions in 
Guyana.  Given our resolution of Lancaster’s claims, these reports are not at issue.  
 
 4  We will assume the IJ gave all of Lancaster’s letters “less weight,” including 
those from family members in the United States.  App. 235.   
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v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012)).  The BIA also rejected Lancaster’s claim of IJ 
bias.  Lancaster filed this petition for review and we appointed counsel. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review the BIA’s final order of 
removal.  As the BIA issued its own decision, we review that decision and not the 
decision of the IJ.  Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review 
questions of law and constitutional claims de novo.  Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 
515 (3d Cir. 2017); Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 Because Lancaster is subject to removal based on an aggravated felony, we may 
review only constitutional claims or questions of law.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C), (D).  
Our Section 1252(a)(2)(D) jurisdiction encompasses both of Lancaster’s claims.  In his 
first claim, Lancaster asserts that the BIA misapplied its own precedent.  This is a 
question of law.  See Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 267 (reviewing claim raised by petitioner 
convicted of an aggravated felony that the BIA’s decision ran “contrary to BIA 
precedent”); see also Avila-Ramirez v. Holder, 764 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(citation omitted) (stating that under Section 1252(a)(2)(D) “[l]egal questions 
include . . . claims that the BIA misread its own precedent”).  In his second claim, 
Lancaster asserts that he was deprived of his due process right to a fair hearing—a 
constitutional claim.  See, e.g., Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 489 (2d Cir. 2008).   
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III 
A 
 As noted, Lancaster first asserts that the BIA misapplied its precedent in affirming 
the IJ’s decision to give his letters “less weight.”  App. 235.  While we agree with 
Lancaster’s interpretation of the relevant BIA precedent, we conclude that the BIA did 
not misapply that precedent to his case.  Therefore, we will deny the petition for review 
on this claim.   
 The BIA precedent at issue is In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 
(BIA 2010), in which the BIA found that letters from friends and relatives did not provide 
substantial support for a petitioner.  In reaching this conclusion, the BIA took into 
account the fact that “[t]he authors of the letters are interested witnesses who were not 
subject to cross-examination.”  Id. at 215.  The BIA, however, did not stop there.  It went 
on to address the content of the letters and to explain why they did not support the 
petitioner’s claim—because they were not current, lacked detail and were not specific to 
the petitioner’s circumstances.  Id. at 215-16.   
 We agree with Lancaster that In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z- does not permit an IJ to give 
letters “less weight,” without regard to their content, solely because the authors are 
interested parties not subject to cross-examination.  Such letters are “entitled, at the very 
least, to be evaluated for their evidentiary value.”  Zhang v. Holder, 702 F.3d 878, 881 
(6th Cir. 2012) (citing In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 215-16).  A court must 
evaluate the content of a petitioner’s letters even if they were written by interested parties 
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“for the express purpose of supporting” the petitioner.  Id. at 882; see also Uwineza v. 
Holder, 781 F.3d 797, 799 (6th Cir. 2015) (same).   
 Nevertheless, we conclude that the BIA properly applied In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z- to 
Lancaster’s case.  The BIA did not sanction the rejection of Lancaster’s letters without 
regard to their content.  Rather, it affirmed the IJ’s treatment of the letters only after 
finding that the “Immigration Judge considered the letters from the respondent’s family 
members as to the harm that the respondent would face upon removal to Guyana.”  
App. 47.  The material that the IJ considered—the “harm that the respondent would face 
upon removal to Guyana”—was the content of the letters.  Id.  As such, we are satisfied 
that the BIA properly applied In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, even if its explanation of this 
precedent could have been more robust. 
B 
 Lancaster further asserts that he was deprived of his right to due process because 
the IJ was biased against him on account of his sexual orientation.  The BIA rejected this 
claim.  We are constrained to deny the petition for review.   
 Due process provides that a petitioner may not be “deprived of his interests” 
absent “a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is 
not predisposed to find against him.”  Wang v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)).  The prohibition on 
IJ bias includes both actual bias and the appearance of bias.  Id. 
 Lancaster asserts that the IJ exhibited bias by asking whether he could avoid harm 
in Guyana by concealing his sexual orientation or not having sex with men.  We do not 
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condone these questions or suggest that they could never give rise to a due process 
violation.  As the Supreme Court has stated, “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in 
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal 
bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual 
persons the right to make this choice.”  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003); see 
also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (recognizing that “sexual 
orientation is both a normal expression of human sexuality and immutable”).  However, 
we will deny Lancaster’s bias claim for the reasons given in Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 
330 F.3d 587, 596 (3d Cir. 2003).  As in Abdulrahman, the IJ did ask questions that 
suggested “problematic generalized assertions of her own.”  Id.  But these questions did 
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because “in the context of the record as a 
whole there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the overall proceedings were biased 
in violation of [Lancaster]’s right to due process.”  Id. 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.5 
                                                 
 5  We also express our gratitude to pro bono counsel for their excellent briefing 
and argument in this matter.  
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